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Abstract The field of Neuro-Engineering seems to be on
the fast track towards accomplishing its ultimate goal of
potentially replacing the nervous system in the face of
disease. Meanwhile, the patients and professionals in-
volved are continuously dealing with human bodily expe-
rience and especially howneuro-engineering devices could
become part of a user’s body schema: the domain of
‘embodied phenomenology’. This focus on embodiment,
however, is not sufficiently reflected in the current litera-
ture on ethical and philosophical issues in neuro-engineer-
ing. In this article we will focus on this lacuna by
explaining existing data on neuro-engineering user’s expe-
riences by using phenomenological concepts such as trans-
parency and the concepts that may facilitate this: function-
ality, sensorimotor feedback and affective tolerance. By
introducing and applying these concepts to four real life
case examples, we will discuss practical implications and
guidelines which can contribute to the actual success of
incorporation of the device by the patient. First, we will
discuss the importance of a ‘Patient Preference Diagnosis’
(PPD), which can serve as a way to prepare the patient for
the existential reorientation involved in the process. In
addition, a Patient Transparency Diagnosis (PTD) during
and after such a process is also relevant when wanting to
provide the medical field in general with feedback, and the
patient in particular with possibilities to fine-tune the de-
vice. From these practical guidelines we will conclude that
the phenomenological approach can be very valuable
when applied to the field of neuro-engineering.
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Abbreviations
ALS Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis
BCI Brain computer interface
DBS Deep brain stimulation
PPD Patient preference diagnosis
PTD Patient transparency diagnosis
SCI Spinal cord injury
SCS Spinal cord stimulation
Introduction
The 1974 movie The Terminal Man paints the picture of
a scientist who implants himself with a brain-implant
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hooked up to a computer in order to counter the seizures
he experiences. Back then this was marked ‘Sci-Fi’. A
little over 40 years later,Nature publishes one of the first
successful case reports involving a brain-computer in-
terface (BCI), restoring the communicative abilities of a
patient with severe Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis
(ALS), a muscle and nervous system disorder, which
ultimately leads to complete isolation due to loss of
muscle function [1]. In the same year, a group in Swit-
zerland [2] succeeded in restoring the walking pattern in
two primates with paraplegia by implanting a spinal
cord stimulator, which translated walking pattern signals
in the brain to actual motor response.
With these latest accomplishments, the field of Neuro-
Engineering, seems to be on the fast track towards its
ultimate goal of replacing the nervous system. Neuro-
engineering or ‘Neural Engineering’ involves the process
of repairing, restoring, replacing, or bypassing the ner-
vous system with the aim of implementing solutions to
problems associated with neurological limitations and
dysfunctions, for example in the face of disease [3]. For
the patients1 in question, these interventions often mean a
step towards a life that healthy people take for granted. In
addition, these interventions often also ask a patient to
incorporate a ‘strange’ body, initiating a process of em-
bodiment which takes a different form in every patient.
As such, neuro-engineering is continuously dealing with
human experience, both of the patients involved, as well
as the family and friends surrounding the patients, and to
a certain extent, even the doctors and technicians
supporting the patients through the process.
In recent literature in the field of neuro-engineering
research, the importance of user-centered design in e.g.
BCI development is being promoted [5–8]. However,
neither this literature, nor the philosophical and bioeth-
ical literature on neuro-engineering in general, seem to
focus on the aspect of bodily experience. In a scoping
review performed by Burwell et al. [9] looking into the
current key issues associated with BCI use, the authors
report the most frequently cited issues to include user
safety, justice, privacy and security. Issues of incorpora-
tion and the effect of BCI use on human experiencewere
not among these issues. When we look at how issues
regarding human experience and neuro-engineering are
discussed in the literature, we notice that many other
aspects than ‘embodiment’ are brought forward. Many
articles focus on the potential effect of neuro-
engineering devices such as BCIs or Deep Brain simu-
lation (DBS) on personality or autonomy [10–15], often
ignoring the more physical component of tool incorpo-
ration. What is more, of the articles that do zoom in on
embodied tools, such as the article by Heersmink [16],
many present with a rather negative connotation, focus-
ing on the current limitations of devices such as BCIs
and the current lack of possibilities for incorporation.
So, although there is no lack of sensitivity to user
experience within the field of neuro-engineering re-
search, the focus on the bodily aspect of the user expe-
rience, remains close to non-existent [17].
A field that does pay attention to human experience
and to the way in which external tools may be incorpo-
rated in a person’s body schema is that of phenomenol-
ogy, and especially the theoretical framework of ‘em-
bodied phenomenology’. An important question here is
how and to what extent a neuro-engineering device is a
tool or can be incorporated as a part of the ‘self’ [16, 18].
In this article, we aim to explain existing data on neuro-
engineering users’ experiences in terms of phenomenolog-
ical theory. We will start out by exploring the phenomeno-
logical concepts of interest to the field of neuro-engineer-
ing, after which we will apply these phenomenological
concepts to the practice of neuro-engineering, in parallel to
philosophers such as Jenny Slatman [19]who have applied
phenomenological concepts to medical interventions in
general. For this purpose, we will introduce a total of four
case examples (Mrs. A, Mr. B and two patients as
interviewed previously by Dalibert [20]). Finally, we will
discuss practical implications and recommendations which
can be of benefit to the field of neuro-engineering.
Four Case Examples –Ms. A,Mr. B,Mr. vanHouten
and Mrs. Bloemen
Ms. A
Ms. A is a real patient, who becameworld-famous when
she received a BCI from a neuroscientific research team
1 Throughout this paper, we refer to the users of neuro-engineering
devices as ‘patients’, as we are ultimately writing with a clinical perspec-
tive in mind. Nevertheless, literature in the field of disability-studies by
authors such as Wolbring [4] argues that associating users of a neuro-
engineering device with ‘patients’ in general is troubling, as it shows a
coverage of disability from a mostly medical angle, emphasizing an
assumed experience of a ‘lack in ability’ in these individuals. Instead they
argue that while neuro-engineering users might be considered disabled,
they can at the same time not understand themselves as ‘patients’, but
rather differently abled or just ‘able’. In the context of this paper, however,
we continue to use the term ‘patient’ given our medical focus.
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in Utrecht which allowed her to spell on a computer
screen by using her brain waves [1]. At the time of the
informed consent, Ms. A was 58 years old and in a
locked-in state due to her disease [1, 21, 22].
During brain surgery, the researchers placed electrodes
of the motor cortex of Ms. A.What then followed was an
intense training period of 28 weeks. The electrodes
placed over the cortile motor movement area of the brain,
were hooked up to a decoding software. By continuously
performing training tasks, which entailed withholding or
activating ‘brain clicks’ on a computer screen, the soft-
ware would get used to interpreting the meaning of
particular signals in the brain activation of Ms. A. On
day 197, the software was accurate enough at decoding
Ms. A’s brain signals: Ms. A could use the spelling
system as an autonomic form of communication.
Mr. B
Mr. B is also a real-life patient who participated in one of
the first experiments using the technique of epidural
stimulation, a form of spinal cord stimulation (SCS)
[23, 24]. Mr. B injured his spinal cord after a severe
vertebral fracture due to a car accident. This left him
with a motor complete paraplegia of the legs.
In the experiment, Mr. B received an electrode with
16 contacts which goes over the lower spinal cord. A
continuous electrical current at different frequencies and
intensities is applied to specific locations on the lower
part of the spinal cord, activating nerve circuits. After
months of intense training in combination with the
epidural stimulation, Mr. B was able to voluntarily
retract and extend his legs, bend his knees, and stand
with assistance of a cane.
Mr. van Houten and Mrs. Bloemen
Mr. van Houten (61 years old) and Mrs. Bloemen
(45 years old) are two real-life patients interviewed in
a case series by Dalibert [20] looking into patient expe-
riences while ‘living with spinal cord stimulation’. Both
patients received epidural SCS, in their case for the
indication of chronic pain, for Mrs. Bloemen due to
diabetic neuropathy, for Mr. van Houten due to failed
back surgery syndrome. The implanted electrodes are
similar to those used for Mr. B and implanted surgically
over the area of the spinal cord related to the patient’s
specific pain perception. The electrical current applied
to the spinal cord modulates the pain signal, allowing
the pain perception to be interrupted.
While for both patients the stimulation technique has
led to a significant reduction in pain perception and in-
crease in independence andmobility, they both experience
the neuro-engineering device significantly differently. As
we will see, this has implications for medical practice.
Phenomenology: the Embodied Experience and Body
Boundaries
Neuro-engineering touches upon the human experience
of body-ownership and ‘ownness’2 in general. By intro-
ducing technical devices which aim to recover some of
the ‘natural’ abilities healthy subjects have, neuro-
engineering asks of the patients to somehow ‘recali-
brate’. This emphasis on experience fits well into the
philosophical tradition of phenomenology. Phenome-
nology has sought to unravel what in the literature is
called Erlebnis, our lived experience of the world, our
body, and others [19]. According to German philoso-
pher Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology,
consciousness makes it possible for humans to be more
than just a passive receiver of stimuli. While sensations
(Empfindungen) are only the raw matter, consciousness
allows us to ‘grasp’ (auffassen) a whole object or situ-
ation. This ‘grasping’ is also called the ‘intentionality’,
the fact that consciousness is always being conscious of
‘something’ [19]. As such, phenomenology focuses on
how things appear to us instead of how things ‘really
are’ [19]. We might see a simple screen with spelling
software, but the same screen could to Ms. A appear as
his/her voice, the only way to interact with the world.
And similarly, a broken screen to Ms. A might mean
something completely different than to the technician
called in to fix it.
Mr. B, after having lost his ability to walk, is left with
two legs still similar to the ones which used to help him
around, but now ‘not functional’. It is this loss of func-
tionality which leaves the patients with a pair of dull
legs, they, as studies suggest often feel alienated towards
[26] or disconnected from [27]. What is more, over time
2 The term ‘ownness’ refers to the term as used within the theoretical
framework of Edmund Husserl [25]. In the context of the current
manuscript, ‘ownness’ is used as describing the delimitation of the self
or the ‘ego’ in Husserl’s terms, consisting of everything that is partic-
ularly one’s own, in contrast to everything that is alien or ‘Fremdes’,
again in Husserlian terms.
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the legs will lose their original shape due to muscle
atrophy, making recognition even more difficult.
This makes one wonder what it is that makes us able
to claim body ownership at all. What is considered my
‘own’? The many different theories in the literature on
this subject show us that answering this question, often
also implies answering questions on identity. Some,
such as the psychologist Baumeister [28], claim that
‘your own’ is all that is held together by your skin, as
such arguing for a view of the self as a ‘bodily self’.
Although patients such as Mr. B undergo changes,
which leave them with non-functional legs, the integrity
of the body is still intact. The skin the patient ‘lives in’ is
still intact, as the same ‘skin-encapsulated ego’.
Some, mostly scientific researchers, claim that every-
thing that ‘contributes’ to your body is yours. In contrast
to the previous theory, functionality plays an important
role here:
BWe propose that the self-attribution of an entity
may be determined, not just by its physical fea-
tures, but by whether the entity can afford actions
that the brain has associated with the limb which
it replaces.^ (p.31) [29]
In the case of paraplegia, this theory would leave the
patient with a great lack of ownership, given the fact
that paraplegia per definition leads to an enormous
lack of functionality.
Embodied Tools, Body Schema’s and Transparency
While the body undergoes tremendous changes
throughout a lifetime, both due to natural process of
aging, as well as more externally mediated changes such
as trauma leading to SCI, most of us manage to contin-
uously identify ourselves with the changing body. We
cut our hair, add clothing and accessories, we observe
newwrinkles on our face, and wemight need time to get
used to them, but eventually we continue to identify
them as ‘ours’. Human beings also use body extensions,
like clothing and tools. It is especially this latter category
of extensions that the field of neuro-engineering is fo-
cused on developing. The question is: can human beings
come to understand these tools as part of themselves, as
part of their body? Can they come to experience and
recognize them as part of their selves, as ‘own’?
In his essay Embodied Tools, Cognitive Tools and
Brain-Computer Interfaces Richard Heersmink [16]
discusses the phenomenological consequences of some
of the earliest forms of BCIs and especially to what
extent these neuro-engineering tools are incorporated
into the ‘body schema’ of the patients and as such could
be considered embodied tools. ‘Body schema’ is a term
often used by French philosopher Merleau-Ponty, who
is known for his notion of ‘embodied’ consciousness.
For Merleau-Ponty, the previously discussed notion of
intentionality, ‘giving meaning to that which appears
and manifests itself ’ (p.66) [19], is a bodily affair. This
intentionality functions without one really being aware
and is a key element of the ‘body schema’. The basis of
this schema follows from a coherence or unity at two
different levels:
1. The parts of the body form a unity that does not just
result from their sum total: the living body is expe-
rienced as one, rather than as a torso with a head,
two arms and two legs attached to it.
2. In its pre-reflective perception and acting, the rela-
tionship between our body and the world is not
oppositional but marked by interaction and harmony.
Don Ihde defines a body schema similarly as ‘a non-
conscious neural representation of the body’s position
and its capabilities for action’ (p.6) [16].Whether or not
tools have the possibility to be incorporated into the
body schema depends on the so called ‘transparency’
of the tools. Martin Heidegger’s distinction between
Zuhanden (ready-to-hand) and Vorhanden (present-at-
hand) illustrates this idea of transparency. Let’s take for
example a hammer. To someone who has never used a
hammer before, the tool might feel clumsy, and that
person is focused on learning how to work with the tool.
As such the tool demands attention, remains in the
forefront and is ‘present-at-hand’. To someone having
used a hammer before and being able to use it properly,
it becomes a true tool, a means with which he can
accomplish his aims. As such, using the tool of a ham-
mer is no longer a point-of-focus, requiring conscious
thought about how to use it, where to hold it, and so on.
Don Ihde builds further on this by stating that when
using embodied tools to interact with the environment,
one does not first intend an action on the tool and then
on the environment. Rather, ‘one merely intends an
action on the environment through the tool and does
not consciously experience the tool when doing so. The
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perceptual focal point is this on the tool-environment
interface, rather than on the agent-tool interface’ (p.6)
[16]. This incorporation takes time, sometimes years as
it will in the case of Ms. A for example, before a patient
is truly able to use the tool properly.
Heersmink [16] mentions two properties of tools
which are beneficial to transparency and as such, em-
bodiment. First of all, he describes how trust in a tool is
necessary for embodiment. If we use the example of a
hammer, one that is stable, in which the handle does not
have the tendency to fall off, will be incorporated more
quickly than one which shows a variable performance.
Second, and quite interestingly, Heersmink [16] dis-
cusses the role of proprioceptive feedback. As we brief-
ly discussed in the case of Mr. B, proprioceptive feed-
back is the sensory information one receives as a result
of a certain movement, and that healthy subjects mostly
take for granted. If we walk, we feel the earth under our
feet, if we slam a hammer on a nail, we feel the backlash
of the force and so on. According to Heersmink [16],
this feedback is necessary while using tools in order to
be able to assess the effect the tool has had on the
environment and the agent. More trust in a tool and
better proprioceptive feedback from it, increase the ease
with which they can become transparent to the user and
hence, embodied.
Functionality, Proprioceptive Feedback and Affective
Tolerance
Jenny Slatman [19] in her book ‘Our strange Body’
reaches similar conclusions to Heersmink [16]. When
looking at what might help a patient tolerate and embody
‘the Strange’, regain of functionality and through that
trust in the tool, as well as the presence of proprioception
or sensory feedback are important. However, Slatman
adds in a third and more difficult concept that in her
opinion plays a role in the embodiment process: emo-
tional or affective tolerance. Jenny Slatman explains this
concept by introducing the example of hand transplanta-
tions. In general, hand transplantations are considered
successful, both in the eyes of the patient as well as the
doctor, when functionality has been regained. However,
there are examples of patients who received single hand
transplantations which too regained almost full function-
ality after the transplantation, with almost no visible
scarring or color differences. However, these patients
do not reach the state of phenomenological unity as the
‘successful’ transplant patients do with a similar level of
functionality. Even though functionality is intact, these
patients explained to still feel a great distance to the hand
and how it looked on their body. In fact, some of these
patients even opt to amputate the transplanted hand not
too long after the initial surgery. As Slatman explains, we
cannot expect everyone to incorporate ‘the Strange’ as
easily. According to Slatman, examples like these make
clear the fact that regain of functionality in itself, and as
such incorporation in the body schema itself, are neces-
sary but not sufficient developments when it comes to
the process of incorporating ‘the Strange’. Rather, emo-
tional or affective tolerance is necessary. Through this
last remark, Slatman also points out the components
missing in theories of philosophers such as Merleau-
Ponty, whose theory on the body schema needs to be
supplemented as his analysis merely starts from ‘handi-
ness’ and functionality.
These three aspects can be further illustrated by ap-
plying them to our case examples. In the case of Ms. A,
almost all functionality is lost. As such, for neuro-
engineering to be able to bring back the level of func-
tionality of these patients to completely normal, a lot
needs to happen. The BCI of Ms. A, however, focuses
on one subset of problems, namely that of communica-
tion. We could say that this new BCI succeeds in its
mission: as one of the first and most advanced devices in
the world, it allows Ms. A to use her computer to
communicate her thoughts and wishes. However, as
one can imagine the device has its limitations. Speed,
accuracy and complexity of language are not at the same
level as it once was. The question now is, to what extent
does this influence Ms. A’s ability to ‘tolerate’ this
external tool, this ‘Strange’?
Secondly, we have the point of sensory feedback to
address. Interestingly enough, in the case of the BCI of
Ms. Awe cannot really speak of sensory feedback, other
than the indirect visual feedback received by seeing the
spelling screen. By using the typing software, Ms. A is
able to communicate to the outside world. However, the
process of typing, and the success of doing so, is not
something Ms. A experiences physically, as she would
when for example opening and closing her mouth to
speak and hearing her voice in the process. Rather, the
feedback is indirect, just as we receive feedback when
correcting a text we have written down on the computer.
Perhaps we could argue, the feedback has mostly oc-
curred during the training period, where Ms. A was
performing multiple tasks per day in order to adjust the
software to her own personal ‘brain-waves’.
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Lastly, the need for affective or emotional tolerance
for ‘the Strange’, which might be difficult if not im-
possible in BCIs. Unlike the previous example of hand
transplantations, which in their exterior mimicked
hands, the BCIs such as used by Ms. A do not have
an exterior easily identifiable as a body part or even
human tissue. Will a patient ever really tolerate this?
On the other hand, we have also discussed examples
of other inanimate tools, which have proven to be
possible to incorporate in the body schema. Hammers,
glasses, hats, we have been able to look beyond these
and use them as tools within our body schema. There-
fore, in the case of neuro-engineering, we might ex-
pect the same.
Now let us take a closer look to Mr. B, our patient
with paraplegia. If we again apply the criterion of func-
tionality, we could say that indeed, the neuro-
engineering device is one which delivers to a certain
extent. Under stimulation and due to the brain implant
which uses the brain’s own waves as an initiation for the
walking pattern, the patient would be able to stand in an
upright position and move about in a reasonably smooth
manner. Other aspects of the spinal cord injury however,
such as bladder control or pain experience, are not
necessarily addressed or tackled by the current neuro-
engineering devices. Intuitively, we might think that the
regain in motor response in itself could be a valuable
addition to the quality of life of the patient. However, for
many patients the lack of mobility itself is not the major
concern. Rather, the limiting problems of bladder con-
trol, but also the extreme pain and spasticity due to the
injury, often have priority for the patient [30, 31]. We
might therefore wonder whether the functionality we
aim for at first glance, is indeed the type of functionality
that matters for the patient.
The point of proprioceptive feedback is a difficult
one. The concept of feedback is of course very impor-
tant in the process of locomotion. Any movement in our
legs leads to a change in our muscles, which in their turn
fire to communicate their position and strength. Due to
this, locomotion continuous to be a smooth, synchro-
nized movement. Therefore, scientists have always been
interested in incorporating feedback in their neuro-
engineering devices. One of the first successful spinal
cord stimulators in paraplegic monkeys indeed
contained a sensory feedback component, by recording
the dorsal roots in the spinal cord (which are responsible
for gathering all the sensory feedback information com-
ing from the hind limbs) and feeding this info back into
the spinal cord stimulation processor, which activates
and steers the locomotion pattern.
However, this feedback in itself is interesting. Unlike
feedback in a healthy physiological state, the neuro-
engineering device does not allow for the conscious
awareness of feedback for the patient. As we discussed,
sensory feedback in the form of proprioception in a
healthy subject is often an unconscious process. We
are for example not continuously made aware of the fact
that our feet are touching the ground. Only when the
situation changes, and we suddenly feel ‘the ground
falling from under us’, we are suddenly forced to pay
attention to the sensory feedback which was once doing
its job in silence. In the case of feedback of these neuro-
engineering devices, however, the feedback is only fed
back into the processor, which creates the algorithm for
the walking pattern. This processor bypasses the spinal
cord injury, as well as the possibility of conscious
awareness for the patient. As such, the functional use
of feedback remains intact, but the felt experience of
feedback is lost.
Lastly, the point of affective tolerance. In the example
of Mr. B in particular we have an interesting situation: a
device which provides electrical current takes over the
locomotion of the patient. One would consider that to be
perhaps quite a severe intervention. However, on the
outside we might see little sign of such an intervention.
Unlike the external screen in the case ofMs. A,Mr. Bwill
have a device implanted dorsally to the spinal cord and
epidural space, which except for some scars from the
surgery, and the contours of the implanted battery, will
show little else on the outside. The most important ques-
tion in this setting then becomes, does that make the
tolerance easier? If one is able to forget the device by
actually not seeing the device?
To summarize, we have discussed a total of three
concepts which influence transparency, leading to em-
bodiment through incorporation in the body schema (see
Fig. 1). We have defined these factors based on previous
literature applying these concepts deduced from phe-
nomenological philosophy to real-life neuro-engineer-
ing users’ experiences [16] or other medical interven-
tions in general [19]. In addition, we have shown how
these concepts can be used to explain user experiences
in two typical case examples, Ms. A and Mr. B. How-
ever, it could be questioned whether these factors draw a
complete picture of all factors involved in transparency.
One potential point of discussion could be the factor of
affective tolerance, which unlike the other two factors,
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seems to allow for more interpretations, as we will see in
the next section. It would be fruitful to further consider
the possible subfactors which form the broader factor of
affective tolerance, perhaps using additional methods
such as qualitative empirical studies, to add to the cur-
rent phenomenological approach.
In addition, the fact that we position ‘incorporation’
as the ultimate goal in this paper is based on the idea
that the neuro-engineering device aims first and fore-
most to repair and restore functionality to a basic
functioning level, as close to ‘normal’ as possible.
Any part of normal functioning when using our body
as ‘a tool’, is the level of transparency we reach with
our body. As previously discussed in the examples of
the hammer as a tool, transparency allows us to per-
form the task without being focused on the tool itself,
making the task easier. Therefore, it is not strange that
a team of engineers, doctors together with the patient
often wish to reach a state of transparency.3 Is this
really necessary? Could we do without? Well, the
examples we have discussed of the current state of
most neuro-engineering devices already show us that,
although we are still far from a level of transparency
we can reach when using a hammer, these devises are
still tremendously helpful for the patients using them.
Therefore, a neuro-engineering device can definitely
work without reaching a full level of transparency.
However, as we have also discussed earlier, reaching
full transparency, and as such being able to ‘ignore’ the
device while using it, makes the device as much a port
of your ‘normal’ body as the original, now
malfunctioning, body part. For the acceptance, or in-
corporation, of such a device into the rest of the body
and the patient’s life as a whole, we believe that to be a
huge benefit.
In order to be able to apply the previously theoretical
concepts in the heterogeneity of practical clinical life,
we will zoom in on some practical implications and
guidelines in the next section.
Practical Implications and Guidelines
If applying the three concepts important for transparen-
cy to two real-life case examples has taught us one thing,
then it is that there is an enormous amount of heteroge-
neity in how and to what extent these concepts apply.
We have seen how functionality in cases such as those of
Mr. B can be a point of debate: is the functionality
gained by a SCS stimulator for motor response really
the type of functionality a paraplegic patient is aiming
for? Also, we have seen how sensory feedback, al-
though present, does not necessarily create more trans-
parency or eases the incorporation of the implant in the
body schema. In addition, when comparing Ms. A to
Mr. B, we have also discussed how emotional or affec-
tive components play a role in our tolerance of neuro-
engineering devices. Although we might expect Ms. A
to have more difficulty in accepting the software re-
quired for communication, as it works through an al-
ways present computer screen, patients with an implant-
able device such as Mr. B also present with emotional
difficulty to accept the implant, even though they are not
clearly reminded of the implant. Another illuminating
example of heterogeneity can be found in the previously
discussed series of patient interviews published by
Dalibert [20]. Dalibert brings forward two contrasting
examples. First of all, Mrs. Bloemen is introduced,
about whom Dalibert states the following:
BVisually, haptically and affectively Mrs. Bloemen
cannot relate to or identify with the SCS. As she
can see and touch the pulse generator under her
skin she cannot identify with and incorporate the
neuromodulation technology. It remains a tool or
an instrument; it is not (a) part of her body^
(p.650) [20].
Fig. 1 Overview of the main concepts related to embodiment
and incorporation
3 One could imagine cases in which transparency is not or not imme-
diately a goal of a neuro-engineering research team, such as in cases
asking for ‘quick and dirty’ solutions for life-threatening scenarios.
Nevertheless, this manuscript and the current paragraph in particular,
argue for reaching transparency in cases where this is possible and
wished for based on the idea of incorporation of a device as a part of the
‘normal’ body. This both from the point of view of the research teams
involved, as well as and especially from the point of view of the
patients, as will be discussed in upcoming sections.
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In contrast to Mrs. Bloemen, Mr. van Houten states the
following about his SCS experience:
BMr. VanHouten is grateful for the neuromodulation
technology that has not only become part of his body
but has also enabled him to do things and to be part
of the world –of life- again. In fact, he is so content
with it that, as he told me later in the interview, he
would like to have a zipper put in his back so that the
world could see his implant, which he calls a pace-
maker for his legs and back^. (p.641) [20]
So, a similar device with a similar position within the
body and with similar functionality and sensory feed-
back, leads to a very different experience between two
patients. In Mr. van Houten’s case, we could state that
the implant is completely incorporated in the body sche-
ma and transparent to such an extent, that the patient
himself wishes it would be more apparent with the help
of a ‘zipper’. Comparing the two cases tells us that
transparency in the case of Mrs. Bloemen seems to be
unrelated to functionality, unrelated to sensory feedback
as such, but an affective or emotional issue, related to
the patient and its specific being-in-the-world. Dalibert
[20] goes on to explain how for Mrs. Bloemen, not only
her own view on the implant, but especially that of her
husband is crucial for the experience of transparency.
She states:
BI don’t like it that he [her husband] can feel it. At
first you make jokes about it but at some point the
fun stops.^ (p.650) [20]
Not only does this statement illustrate the lack of trans-
parency in Mrs. Bloemen’s particular case, but also the
fact that Mrs. Bloemen is very much focused on what
Merleau-Ponty defined as ‘Body Image’. Gallagher [32]
describes the concept of ‘Body Image’ as follows:
B[...] an intentional content of consciousness that
consists of a system of perceptions, attitudes, and
beliefs pertaining to one's own body .^ (p.149) [32]
Instead of incorporating the device into the body sche-
ma and allowing it to disappear as any truly functional
tool would, Mrs. Bloemen is ‘stuck on’ the ‘Body
Image’ of the device, making it hard to truly accept
‘the Strange’. We could state that this notion of ‘Body
Image’ is an influencing factor for the concept of
affective tolerance, as depicted in Fig. 1. Whether or
not a patient will turn out like a Mrs. Bloemen is a
difficult prediction to make beforehand. It requires
careful consideration and conversation, allowing the
patient to draw up possible scenarios involving neuro-
engineering devices, their consequences, and the pa-
tient’s ability to accomplish the existential reconstruc-
tion necessary to leave the stage of ‘body-image focus’,
allow for affective tolerance and reach transparency.
What this boils down to is the fact that the experiences
of patients with regard to the ‘embodiment’ of a BCI
can be very different, even if many of the factors that
facilitate embodiment such as functionality are present.
That is exactly why phenomenology can be useful in a
collaboration with neuro-engineering.
Patient Preference Diagnosis
In the last decades, medicine has come to realize more
and more that patient preferences should be reckoned
with in making treatment decisions, and informed con-
sent and shared decision-making are concepts that are
nowadays prominent in medical research and practice.
In an editorial comment in the British Medical Journal
(BMJ) [33] Godlee has made a plea for a ‘new’ form of
diagnosis, named the ‘Patient Preference Diagnosis’
(PPD). In the absence of such a PPD:
BThe doctor recommends treatment based onwhat
is known of the patient’s disease, age, and general
health, and using evidence on which treatments
work best, but fails to discover what matters most
to the patient^ (p. 7745) [33].
An important goal of the PPD is to draw a ‘map’ of
the patient’s wishes, values and norms, as well as for
example the patient’s vision on his or her body. Part of
the PPD conversation is to draw out the scenarios of life
after neuro-engineering interventions and possible con-
sequences of each scenario within a patient’s life to
come to an understanding which is as well-rounded as
possible. When applying this to clinical neuro-engineer-
ing, we could say that any neuro-engineering endeavor
requires a great deal of PPD before even starting the
process. But more than that, it requires continuous at-
tention during and after the process of implantation,
training etc. What neuro-engineering in combination
with phenomenology has taught us, is although we can
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formulate concepts that are important in the process of
neuro-engineering, it boils down to the patient in spe-
cific to come to the conclusion whether and how the
device is incorporated in the body schema and leads to a
comfortable degree of transparency. It requires a form of
existential reorientation.
Although this focus on inquiring information on
patients’ preferences is already an important part of the
shared decision-making effort in the clinic, it is far less
common to inform, inquire and discuss about the bodily
experiences of a patient in relation to an intervention.
This lacuna is exactly the reason why the phenomeno-
logical approach can be very valuable when applied to
the field of neuro-engineering.
Although doctors have experience in how to intro-
duce their patients to concepts such as an implant, a
stimulator, an electrical wire and so on, understanding
what is going to happen and trying to picture what the
experience of having such an implant in your body will
be like, are extremely different things. Especially when
it is unknown to the patient what the complete set of
consequences of such a device will be. How will the
implant feel?What will others see of it? Howwell will it
stay in place? Will it restrict the patient in any way? All
questions that are answered differently depending on the
patient sitting across from the table. Emphasis on the
PPD as part of the medical process at least ‘normalizes’
the effort and makes sure this almost ‘existential thera-
py’ is part of the routine.
In order to assess the actual level of ‘incorporation’
or ‘existential reorientation’, we suggest the addition
of a form of ‘Patient Transparency Diagnosis’ (PTD),
with which physicians, engineers and other neuro-
engineering experts take the time during the process
to together with the patient reflect on how the incor-
poration is going, and especially, on how to improve
this if necessary.
Patient Transparency Diagnosis
Although the previously discussed PPD is already quite
incorporated into the medical field, it is important, es-
pecially when it comes to neuro-engineering, to look at
the whole of the process and assess its success. Most
importantly is to realize what to judge this success by.
Previously we have discussed the concepts of function-
ality, sensory feedback and emotional tolerance. How-
ever, what we were actually assessing were three
concepts that in theory and often in practice lead to
transparency and incorporation into the body schema.
As one of the patients of Dalibert describes, as it ‘be-
longing to their body’. Dalibert describes this as fol-
lows: Bwhile embodiment of SCS is necessary to live
with the technology, it is not sufficient to live well with it:
the technology must be incorporated^. (p. 7745) [20].
Therefore, it is important to have regular reflective
conversations with patients on the level of transparency
and incorporation of their device throughout the neuro-
engineering intervention process, as well as afterwards.
These conversations will have to center around the
actual current level of transparency, the desired level
of transparency given the desired level of incorporation,
as well as the importance the patient would like to
adhere to the concept of transparency in the first place.
These questions that will have to be asked to truly
assess this, are to their core phenomenological, asking
a patient to communicate his or her experience with the
device form their perspective, within their situational
being-in-the-world. It is here where doctors or engi-
neers are asked to think as phenomenologists, and get
to the core of the patient’s experience. Not only will
these questions lead to immediate feedback for the
medical profession and its success in the field of
neuro-engineering, but it will also allow for possible
adjustments of the device to the likings of the patient.
Imagine a Mrs. Bloemen, who is self-conscious about
her husband seeing the device in her back and as such
seems to be stuck on the concept of ‘Body Image’ as
Merleau-Ponty discusses. Figuring out this underlying
problem, and what is the assumption behind it (e.g. ‘I
am not truly feminine if I have such a bulge sticking out
from by back’) through phenomenological inquiry. This
discovery might give opportunities to cater to her
wishes, in such a way that Mrs. Bloemen herself was
not aware of. Perhaps, next time the battery of the
device needs to be changed surgically, the surgeons
can decide to place the stimulator on a more subtle
location, in line with the preferences of mrs. Bloemen.
For a patient receiving a neuro-engineering device for
medical reasons, the body in itself has lost its transparen-
cy when it turned into an ‘ill body’. Complete regain of
transparency might therefore be difficult or impossible.
However, the ultimate goal a device could reach is giving
a patient the feeling of ‘belonging somewhere again, as
being part of life’ (p.647) [19]. As Slatman herself de-
scribes, there is no straightforward, pre-existing mold in
which we can pour every neuro-engineering device to
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reach this ultimate goal. As was clear from our examples,
not even the location of implantation, the shape of the
device or the workings of the device are easily general-
ized. For children, different criteria need to be met than
for adults. For women, different aspects play a role than
for men. And for woman A, different criteria are relevant
than for woman B.
The Body as both Leib and Körper
Previously we have discussed how the notion of inten-
tionality makes two different dimensions of the body
visible: the body as intentional object or as holding an
intentional orientation. Or in other words, ‘having a
body’ versus ‘being a body’ [19].
This distinction of the body as a thing and the body as
a non-thing, is also described by Husserl using the terms
Leib and Körper. On the one hand Husserl distinguishes
an animate reality, which is constituted by what he calls
Leib. This animate body co-exists with the inanimate
matter, which he calls Körper. The co-existing nature is
important to emphasize: the two terms refer to different
aspects of one and the same living body. According to
Husserl it is the Leibwhich is themedium or organ of all
perceptions (Wahrnemungsorgan [19]). This distinction
between Leib andKörper is sometimes also described as
a distinction between the ‘pre-reflective body-aware-
ness’ on the one hand and ‘reflective consciousness’
on the other hand [34].
As a final practical recommendation, we propose the
importance of both patient and doctor to be able to
‘oscillate’ between these concepts of Leib and Körper.
The concept of ‘oscillations’ is discussed by Carel et al.
in the Lancet [35]:
BOur suggestion is to try to move from viewing the
physician’s perspective as objective and the pa-
tient’s perspective as subjective towards a greater
appreciation of the oscillation from one position
to the other. This oscillation does not denote an
inconsistency. On the contrary: it marks the
unique duality of the human body, which is capa-
ble of both subjective experiencing and of being
experienced by others as an object. Recognizing
the oscillation as key to understanding human
experience in its openness and vulnerability might
serve as a step towards contesting the expectation
that doctors should be purely objective in their
clinical practice.^ (p.2335) [35]
By allowing the patient and the doctor to oscillate, both
separately and as a team, between seeing the body as an
object, a machine with a problem to fix using engineering,
and the body as lived, as body which needs to incorporate
the engineering device as its own in order to be able to
function properly, the doctor and patient will cover all
relevant grounds of the process. While as we saw, func-
tionality and sensory feedback pushes us towards a more
Körper view of the body, it is necessary to progressively
move towards promoting and achieving transparency.
Once the physical constraints and necessities are ad-
dressed, we can focus on the emotional, and affective side
of tolerance, the inter-patient difference which is tied to
each patient’s being-in-the-world and his wishes, wants
and expectations that comewith that. The fact that we here
seem to speak of oscillation to illustrate the process,
however, must not fool us into believing that the concepts
of Leib and Körper are any less intertwined than they
actually are. It is worth noting that the Leib-aspect of the
experience of the body in itself is very much linked to a
knowledge of the state of the Körper, continuously mak-
ing the one an inevitable (counter-)part of the other.
Conclusion
We started out this article by bringing forward the im-
portance of human experience in neuro-engineering en-
deavors, and the lack of exposure of and practical guide-
lines on the aspect of tool embodiment in current discus-
sions. In order to bridge this gap, we have zoomed in on
some typical case examples, through which we have
been able to apply the relevant phenomenological con-
cepts. In addition to elaborating on the general concept of
embodiment, in relation to theories on body schema and
body image from philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty,
we have taken the concepts of functionality, sensory
feedback, and affective tolerance as points of reference.
After applying these concepts to the field of neuro-
engineering in particular, we were able to conclude that
indeed the concepts helped to explain and understand
patients’ experiences. While not claiming to be conclu-
sive in this aspect, the current paper does draw up a first,
broad outline of the concepts at stake when approaching
neuro-engineering with a phenomenological outlook.
Next, we have made suggestions for practical impli-
cation in which neuro-engineering seems to need and be
able to collaborate with phenomenology. We have seen
how previously discussed general concepts on tolerance
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after neuro-engineering interventions will never draw the
complete picture for the patient. Indeed, the process
involved in neuro-engineering is a very individual and
personal one. In the lacuna that is found between adher-
ence to the concepts of functionality, feedback and af-
fective tolerance on the one hand, and the actual success
of incorporation of the device by the patient on the other
hand, lies a field where neuro-engineering and phenom-
enology overlap and are ‘on the same team’.
From here on out we have moved on to argue for the
introduction of ‘Patient Transparency Diagnosis’
(PTD), which will allow an engineer, doctor or any other
relevant expert to use phenomenological inquiry as a
way to successfully guide, facilitate and encourage the
incorporation of a neuro-engineering device into a pa-
tient’s body schema, eventually leading up to a satisfac-
tory level of transparency and existential reorientation.
In addition, we have discussed what practical recom-
mendation and/or guidelines could be extracted from this
line of argumentation. Firstly, we have discussed the
importance of a ‘Patient Preference Diagnosis’ (PPD),
which although more and more recognized in the med-
ical field, deserves more attention as a way to start-off a
neuro-engineering endeavor between a patient and his
team of experts and warm up the patient for the existen-
tial reorientation which will follow from the process.
Secondly, additional to the focus on PPD before starting
the neuro-engineering process with a patient, a PTD
during and after such a process is also relevant when
wanting to provide the medical field in general with
feedback, and the patient in particular with possibilities
to fine-tune the device. Lastly, we have discussed how,
by allowing the patient and the doctor to oscillate be-
tween the Leib and Körper aspect of the body, we open
up opportunity to better reach a state of transparency, and
as such, embodiment of neuro-engineering tools.
By emphasizing the role phenomenological consider-
ations can play within the field of neuro-engineering, we
not only provide the field in general and the patient in
particular with an opportunity to benefit from this per-
spective, but also show what synergistic collaboration
neuro-engineering and phenomenology can establish. To
be able to actually achieve this potential benefit of phe-
nomenology, the field of neuro-engineering should not
only be aware of phenomenological practice, but should
facilitate its application, be it in the form of phenomeno-
logical representatives in multidisciplinary teams or em-
bedding of phenomenological approaches in (medical)
education to cater for future generations of professionals.
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of Interest The authors declare that there is no conflict
of interest.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestrict-
ed use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source,
provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if
changes were made.
References
1. Vansteensel, Mariska J., Elmar G.M. Pels, Martin G.
Bleichner, Mariana P. Branco, Timothy Denison, Zachary
V. Freudenburg, Peter Gosselaar, Sacha Leinders, Thomas
H. Ottens, MaxA. van den Boom, Peter C. van Rijen, Erik J.
Aarnoutse, and Nick F. Ramsey. 2016. Fully implanted
brain–computer interface in a locked-in patient with ALS.
New England Journal of Medicine 375: 2060–2066.
https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa1608085.
2. Capogrosso, Marco, Tomislav Milekovic, David Borton,
Fabien Wagner, Eduardo Martin Moraud, Jean-Baptiste
Mignardot, Nicolas Buse, Jerome Gandar, Quentin Barraud,
David Xing, Elodie Rey, Simone Duis, Yang Jianzhong, Wai
Kin D. Ko, Qin Li, Peter Detemple, Tim Denison, Silvestro
Micera, Erwan Bezard, Jocelyne Bloch, and Grégoire
Courtine. 2016. A brain–spine interface alleviating gait defi-
cits after spinal cord injury in primates. Nature Publishing
Group 539: 284–288. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature20118.
3. Durand, Dominique M. 2007. What is neural engineering?
Journal of Neural Engineering 4. https://doi.org/10.1088
/1741-2552/4/4/E01.
4. Wolbring, Gregor, Lucy Diep, Sophya Yumakulov, Natalie
Ball, Verlyn Leopatra, and Dean Yergens. 2013. Emerging
therapeutic enhancement enabling health technologies and
their discourses: What is discussed within the health do-
main? Healthcare 1: 20–52. https://doi.org/10.3390
/healthcare1010020.
5. Schreuder, Martijn, Angela Riccio, Monica Risetti, Sven
Dähne, Andrew Ramsay, John Williamson, Donatella
Mattia, and Michael Tangermann. 2013. Artificial intelli-
gence in medicine user-centered design in brain – computer
interfaces—A case study.Artificial Intelligence inMedicine
59: 71–80. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artmed.2013.07.005.
6. Kübler, Andrea, ElisaM. Holz, Angela Riccio, Claudia Zickler,
Tobias Kaufmann, Sonja C. Kleih, Pit Staiger-Sälzer, Lorenzo
Desideri, Evert Jan Hoogerwerf, and Donatella Mattia. 2014.
The user-centered design as novel perspective for evaluating the
usability of BCI-controlled applications. PLoS ONE 9.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0112392.
7. Bod Plass Oude, Danny, Mannes Poel, and Anton Nijholt.
2011. A study in user-centered design and evaluation of mental
tasks for BCI. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including
subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture
Embodiment in Neuro-engineering Endeavors: Phenomenological Considerations and Practical Implications
Notes in Bioinformatics), 6524 LNCS: 122–134. https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-3-642-17829-0_12.
8. Nijboer, Femke. 2015. Technology transfer of brain-
computer interfaces as assistive technology: Barriers and
opportunities. Annals of Physical and Rehabilitation
Medicine 58: 35–38. ht tps: / /doi .org/10.1016/j .
rehab.2014.11.001.
9. Burwell, Sasha, Matthew Sample, and Eric Racine. 2017.
Ethical aspects of brain computer interfaces: A scoping
review. BMC Medical Ethics 18. https://doi.org/10.1186
/s12910-017-0220-y.
10. De Haan, Sanneke, Erik Rietveld, Martin Stokhof, and
Damiaan Denys. 2017. Becoming more oneself? Changes
in personality following DBS treatment for psychiatric dis-
orders: Experiences of OCD patients and general consider-
ations. PLoS ONE 12. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.
pone.0175748.
11. Cyron, Donatus. 2016. Mental side effects of deep brain
stimulation (DBS) for movement disorders: The futility of
denial. Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience 10. https://doi.
org/10.3389/fnint.2016.00017.
12. Klaming, Laura, and Pim Haselager. 2013. Did my brain
implant make me do it? Questions raised by dbs regarding
psychological continuity, responsibility for action and men-
tal competence. Neuroethics 6: 527–539. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s12152-010-9093-1.
13. Unterrainer, Marcus, and Fuat S. Oduncu. 2015. The ethics
of deep brain stimulation (DBS).Medicine, Health Care and
Philosophy 18: 475–485. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-
015-9622-0.
14. Jeunet, Camille, Bernard Nkaoua, Sriram Subramanian,
Martin Hachet, and Fabien Lotte. 2015. Predicting mental
imagery-based BCI performance from personality, cognitive
profile and neurophysiological patterns. PLoS ONE 10.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0143962.
15. Lewis, Catharine J., Franziska Maier, Nina Horstkötter,
Alicja Zywczok, Karsten Witt, Carsten Eggers, Thomas D.
Meyer, T.A. Dembek, M. Maarouf, E. Moro, M. Zurowski,
C. Woopen, J. Kuhn, and L. Timmermann. 2015.
Subjectively perceived personality and mood changes asso-
ciated with subthalamic stimulation in patients with
Parkinson’s disease. Psychological Medicine 45: 73–85.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291714001081.
16. Heersmink, Richard. 2013. Embodied tools, cognitive tools
and brain-computer interfaces. Neuroethics 6: 207–219.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-011-9136-2.
17. Gilbert, Frederic, Mark J. Cook, Terence J. O’Brien, and Judy
Illes. 2017. Embodiment and estrangement: Results from first-
in-human Bintelligent BCI^ trial. Science and Engineering
Ethics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-017-0001-5.
18. Clark, Andy. 2013. Re-inventing ourselves: The plasticity of
embodiment, sensing, and mind. In The transhumanist read-
er: classical and contemporary essays on the science, tech-
nology, and philosophy of the human future, 113–127.
https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118555927.ch11.
19. Slatman, Jenny. 2014. Our strange body: Philosophical
reflections on identity and medical interventions.
Amsterdam: University Press.
20. Dalibert, Lucie. 2016. Living with spinal cord stimulation.
Science, Technology & Human Values 41: 635–659.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243915617833.
21. Schulte-Mattler, Wilhelm J. 2015. Amyotrophe
Lateralsklerose (ALS). Neurophysiologie-Labor 37: 233–
239. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neulab.2015.09.001.
22. Musarò, Antonio. 2013. Understanding ALS: New thera-
peutic approaches. FEBS Journal 280: 4315–4322.
https://doi.org/10.1111/febs.12087.
23. Angeli, Claudia A., V. Reggie Edgerton, Yury P.
Gerasimenko, and Susan J. Harkema. 2014. Altering spinal
cord excitability enables voluntary movements after chronic
complete paralysis in humans. Brain 137: 1394–1409.
https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/awu038.
24. Harkema, Susan, Yury Gerasimenko, Jonathan Hodes, Joel
Burdick, Claudia Angeli, Yangsheng Chen, Christie
Ferreira, et al. 2011. Effect of epidural stimulation of the
lumbosacral spinal cord on voluntary movement, standing,
and assisted stepping after motor complete paraplegia: A
case study. The Lancet 377: 1938–1947. https://doi.
org/10.1016/S0140-6736(11)60547-3.
25. Kockelmans, Joseph J. 1994. Edmund Husserl’s phenome-
nology. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press.
26. van Diemen, Tijn, Christel van Leeuwen, Ilse van Nes, Jan
Geertzen, and Marcel Post. 2017. Body image in patients
with spinal cord injury during inpatient rehabilitation.
Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation 98:
1126–1131. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apmr.2016.10.015.
27. Bailey, K. Alysse, Kimberley L. Gammage, Cathy van
Ingen, and David S. Ditor. 2017. BMy body was my
temple^: A narrative revealing body image experiences fol-
lowing treatment of a spinal cord injury. Disability and
Rehabilitation 39: 1886–1892. https://doi.org/10.1080
/09638288.2016.1211753.
28. Lawrence, Natalie Kerr. 2008. On social psychology and
human nature: An interview with Roy Baumeister. Teaching
of Psychology 35: 132–138. https://doi.org/10.1080
/00986280802035044.
29. Aymerich-Franch, Laura, and Gowrishankar Ganesh. 2016.
The role of functionality in the body model for self-attribu-
tion. Neuroscience Research 104: 31–37. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.neures.2015.11.001.
30. Lo, Charles, Yvonne Tran, Kim Anderson, Ashley Craig,
and James Middleton. 2016. Functional priorities in persons
with spinal cord injury: Using discrete choice experiments to
determine preferences. Journal of Neurotrauma 33: 1958–
1968. https://doi.org/10.1089/neu.2016.4423.
31. Mittmann, Nicole, Sander L. Hitzig, and B. Catharine
Craven. 2014. Predicting health preference in chronic spinal
cord injury. The Journal of Spinal Cord Medicine 37: 548–
555. https://doi.org/10.1179/2045772314Y.0000000249.
32. Gallagher, Shaun. 1986. Body image and body schema: A
conceptual clarification. Journal of Mind and Behaviour 7:
541–554. https://doi.org/10.2307/43853233.
33. Godlee, Fiona. 2012. Diagnosing the patient’s preference.
BMJ 345: 7745. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.e7745.
34. Gallagher, Shaun. 2014. Phenomenology and embodied
cognition. In Routledge handbook of embodied cognition,
9–18. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315775845.ch1.
35. Carel, Havi, and Jane MacNaughton. 2012. The art of med-
icine: BHow do you feel?^: Oscillating perspectives in the
clinic. The Lancet 379: 2334–2335. https://doi.org/10.1016
/S0140-6736(12)61007-1.
S. S. Tbalvandany et al.
